Abstract-The security of control systems under sensor attacks is investigated. Redundant observability is introduced, explaining existing security notions including the security index, attack detectability, and observability under attacks. Equivalent conditions between redundant observability and existing notions are presented. Based on a bank of partial observers utilizing Kalman decomposition and a decoder exploiting redundancy, an estimator design algorithm is proposed enhancing the resilience of control systems. This scheme substantially improves computational efficiency utilizing far less memory.
Notation: The subset of natural numbers, {1, 2, · · · , p} ⊂ N, is denoted by [p] . The cardinality of a set S is denoted by |S| and the support of a vector y ∈ C p is defined as supp(y) := {i ∈ [p] : y i = 0} where y i is the i-th element of y. The cardinality of supp(y) defines the 0 norm of a vector y, i.e., y 0 := |supp(y)|. A vector y is said to be q-sparse if y 0 ≤ q. The set Σ q := {y ∈ C p : y 0 ≤ q} denotes the set of all q-sparse vectors. The 2-norm of a vector y is defined as y 2 := √ y * y where y * is the Hermitian of y. Assume that a vector y ∈ C p and a subset Λ ⊂ [p] of indices are given. We use the notation y Λ ∈ C p to denote that y Λ is obtained by setting the elements of y indexed by Λ c := [p] \ Λ = {i ∈ [p] : i / ∈ Λ} to zero. Similar notation is used for a matrix C ∈ R p×n . The matrix obtained by setting the rows of C indexed by Λ c to zero, is denoted as C Λ ∈ R p×n . Sometimes the notation will be slightly modified to y π Λ ∈ C |Λ| (or C π Λ ∈ R |Λ|×n ), which denotes the vector y (or the matrix C) whose elements (or rows) not corresponding to the index set Λ are actually eliminated.
For a given index i ∈ [p], the index set Γ A preliminary version of this paper was presented at the 14th European Control Conference (ECC'15) as [1] , where a theoretical derivation of resilient state estimation for a continuous-time system was mainly discussed without any concrete structure, detailed operation algorithm, or relationship with the security index and attack detection. A vector z ∈ C np of length np can be split into p column vectors of length n, i.e., z = z n 1 z n 2 · · · z n p ∈ C np , where z n i ∈ C n represents the i-th split column vector of length n in z. Then we call z an n-stacked vector. With the index set Γ n i defined above, it follows that z n i = z π Γ n i ∈ C n . The (n-stacked) support of z ∈ C np is defined as supp n (z) := {i ∈ [p] : z n i = 0 n×1 } and its cardinality defines the (n-stacked) 0 norm of z, i.e., z 0 n := |supp n (z)|. Similarly to the usual vector case, an n-stacked vector z is said to be (n-stacked) q-sparse when it holds that z 0 n ≤ q, and the set Σ n q := {z ∈ C np : z 0 n ≤ q} denotes the set of all (n-stacked) q-sparse vectors.
For a matrix C ∈ R p×n , the cospark of C is defined as cospark(C) := min
Cx 0 and the (n-stacked) cospark of a matrix Φ ∈ R np×n is similarly defined as cospark n (Φ) := min
Φx 0 n . Subspaces R(C) and N (C) denote the range space and the null space of C, respectively. The induced matrix 2-norm of a matrix C is defined as C 2 := λ max (C C) = σ max (C) where λ max (·) and σ max (·) denote the maximum eigenvalue and the maximum singular value, respectively. In addition, σ min (·) is used to denote the minimum singular value and C † is the pseudoinverse of C. Finally, the set of normalized eigenvectors of a square matrix A ∈ R n×n is denoted as V(A) := {v ∈ C n : Av = λv for some λ ∈ C, v 2 = 1} .
I. INTRODUCTION The reliability of systems in various circumstances is one of the main concerns for control engineers, and thus robust and fault-tolerant control methods have been developed to cope with model uncertainties, external disturbances, and failures in system components. Recently, new threats or vulnerabilities caused by malicious attacks have been reported as advances in computers and communications increase the connectivity and openness of systems [2] . Therefore, the resilience of control systems to attack has become a critical system design consideration [3] [4] [5] and the security problems of the system whose measurements are compromised by adversaries have been studied actively because sensors are one of the most vulnerable points for the security of control systems [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] .
In this paper, we consider a discrete-time linear time invariant (LTI) system under sensor attacks written as
where x ∈ R n denotes the state variables, u ∈ R m denotes the control inputs, y ∈ R p denotes the attack-free sensor outputs, andȳ ∈ R p denotes the measurement data under attack signals. The dynamics are disrupted by the process disturbance d ∈ R n and sensors are corrupted by the sensor attack a ∈ R p as well as the measurement noise n ∈ R p . There is a total of p sensors that measure the system outputs and the i-th measurement data at time k is denoted byȳ i (k) = c i x(k)+n i (k)+a i (k), where c i is the i-th row of C. It is assumed that the disturbances/noises are uniformly bounded, and the attacks can compromise up to q out of p sensor outputs, as follows. Assumption 1. The process disturbance d and each measurement noise n i are uniformly bounded, i.e.,
There exist at least p − q sensors that are not attacked for all k ≥ 0, i.e.,
The primary objective of this paper is to design an estimator E that detects the attacked sensors and estimates the state x(k) of the given system P under Assumptions 1 and 2. To this end, we first characterize the conditions under which the attack can be detected and the state of P can be estimated correctly. Then, we construct an attack-resilient estimator E that is composed of p partial observers 1 O i and a decoder D as shown in Fig. 1 . In other words, the characterization of observability with unknown signal a and construction of the estimator are the two main topics of this paper. 2 In the first part of this paper, a vulnerability analysis is conducted. Fundamental limitations such as attack detectability (and identifiability) conditions have been investigated in [4] and the attack detectability is quantified by the security index [7] , which is the minimum number of attacks to remain undetectable. This security index concept for a static output map is generalized to a dynamical system under sensor attacks in [8] . We have carefully explained the relationship between 1 In this paper, the terms "observer" and "estimator" are used to indicate the block of O i and E in Fig. 1 , respectively. That is, two terminologies should be distinguished. 2 From the control theoretic perspective, strong observability [16] and unknown input observer (UIO)-based fault estimation [17] may be closely related to the subject of interest here. If we consider the output equation y(k) = Cx(k) + n(k) + I Λ a(k) (instead of imposing Assumption 2 on a in (1)) where I ∈ R p×p is an identity matrix and Λ ⊂ [p] is any index set satisfying |Λ| ≤ q, then, as mentioned in [11] , the problem of interest is strong observability for any q-sparse identity matrix I Λ , and the design of a UIO-based estimator for unknown Λ.
these fundamental limitations and the redundant observability, which is a kind of the analytical redundancy in measurements and will be formally defined in Section III. Furthermore, equivalent conditions between them are also presented.
In the second part of this paper, we propose a resilient and robust state estimation scheme. Compared with the existing resilient estimation algorithms in [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] , the advantages of our scheme are as follows. First, it does not require any additional restrictive conditions other than the redundant observability (compared with [9] , [11] , [13] , [15] ). Second, an observer-based algorithm makes it possible to estimate the current state, not the initial state or delay information (compared with [9] , [10] , [12] ). Third, the scheme is robust in the sense that a bound on estimation error is explicitly derived from system parameters (compared with [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] ). Finally, the scheme requires less computational effort and less memory owing to the reduction in time and space complexity (compared with [14] ).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the theoretical background of static error correcting problems for a stacked vector case. We then present the relationship between redundant observability and security related concepts such as dynamic security index, attack detectability, and observability under attacks in Section III. In addition, partial observers using the Kalman observability decomposition are designed and the overall resilient and robust estimation scheme is presented in Section IV. Finally, simulation results with a three inertia system are given in Section V and we provide concluding remarks in Section VI.
II. STATIC ERROR CORRECTION FOR STACKED VECTOR
In this section, a static error correcting algorithm is studied that will play a key role for constructing the decoder D in the estimator E. In particular, we solve a particular problem: given a matrix Φ ∈ R np×n , recover an unknown vector x ∈ R n from the known measurementẑ given by
where the n-stacked vectorẑ ∈ R np is corrupted by two more unknown vectors v ∈ R np and e ∈ R np . The vector v represents noise and is assumed to have bounded magnitude. The vector e is called error, and it corresponds to an attack signal whose magnitude can be arbitrarily large but is assumed to be sparse. The matrix Φ is called a coding matrix.
A. Error Detectability and Detection Scheme
One should be able to detect the existence of an error to reconstruct the original state vector x. Thus, we start this subsection by introducing the notion of error detectability when the measurementẑ in (2) is noise-free (i.e., v = 0 np×1 ).
Definition 1. A coding matrix Φ ∈ R
np×n is said to be (nstacked) q-error detectable if, for all x, x ∈ R n and e ∈ Σ n q such that Φx + e = Φx , it holds that x = x . Therefore, the matrix Φ ∈ R np×n is not (n-stacked) q-error detectable if and only if there are two different x and x in R n , and e in Σ n q such that Φx + e = Φx . Now, two more equivalent conditions that characterize the error detectability of a coding matrix Φ are given. Proposition 1. The following are equivalent: (i) the matrix Φ ∈ R np×n is (n-stacked) q-error detectable; (ii) for every set Λ ⊂ [p] satisfying |Λ| ≥ p − q, Φ Λ n (or, equivalently, Φ π Λ n ) has full column rank; (iii) for any x ∈ R n where x = 0 n×1 , Φx 0 n > q.
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii): Suppose that (ii) does not hold, i.e., there exists an index set Λ ⊂ [p] with |Λ| ≥ p − q and x = 0 n×1 such that Φ Λ n x = 0 np×1 . Then it follows that e 0 n ≤ q where e := −Φx. Thus, Φx + e = Φ0 n×1 , and Φ is not q-error detectable.
(ii) ⇒ (iii): Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there exists
obvious that |Λ| ≥ p − q and Φ Λ n x = 0 np×1 . This contradicts the full column rank condition of Φ Λ n in (ii).
We again prove it by contradiction. Suppose that Φ is not q-error detectable. That is, there exist x, x ∈ R n satisfying x = x , and e ∈ Σ n q such that Φx + e = Φx . It follows from x − x = 0 n×1 and e ∈ Σ n q that Φ(x − x) 0 n = e 0 n ≤ q. Thus, condition (iii) does not hold. Remark 1. In Proposition 1, condition (ii) relates q-error detectability to the left invertibility of Φ. That is, Φ remains left invertible even if any (n-stacked) q row blocks are eliminated. We may call this property q-redundant left invertibility. On the other hand, condition (iii) establishes the link between the error detectability and the cospark of a coding matrix. More specifically, Φ is q-error detectable if and only if its cospark is larger than q, i.e., cospark n (Φ) > q. ♦
The equivalence conditions in Proposition 1 lead to a criterion of q-sparse error detection based on a residual signal
Lemma 1. For the measurementẑ = Φx+e where Φ ∈ R np×n is (n-stacked) q-error detectable, x ∈ R n , and e ∈ Σ n q , let r = z −ΦΦ †ẑ . Then e = 0 np×1 if and only if r = 0 np×1 . Moreover, when e = 0 np×1 , the vector x is recovered byx := Φ †ẑ .
Proof. Note that any non-zero q-sparse error e does not lie in R(Φ) by Proposition 1.(iii). Hence, e = 0 np×1 is equivalent to the condition thatẑ = Φx + e / ∈ R(Φ). Since ΦΦ † is a projection matrix and it projectsẑ onto R(Φ), we haveẑ / ∈ R(Φ) if and only ifẑ = ΦΦ †ẑ . This completes the proof.
Inspired by the error detection scheme for the noiseless case of Lemma 1, let us now consider a scheme for the case when the bounded noise v ∈ R np corrupts the measurements. For
Then, the following theorem says that one can "practically" detect the q-sparse error in the noisy situation with the residual r given in (3).
and r =ẑ − Φx. Then:
In the case of (ii),
which follows from the fact that
2 for all i ∈ Λ from the assumption, we have
which leads to the result that
Therefore, it is obtained that
Since e n i 2 = 0 for all i ∈ Λ, this completes the proof.
In fact, when the magnitude of e is small, one cannot differentiate between the noise v and the error e. Theorem 1.
(ii) reflects this fact and guarantees that the estimation error is small andx approximately estimates x.
B. Error Correctability and Reconstruction Scheme
In the noiseless case, the following notion of error correctability is introduced and characterized in this subsection.
Definition 2. A coding matrix Φ ∈ R
np×n is said to be (nstacked) q-error correctable if, for all x 1 , x 2 ∈ R n and e 1 , e 2 ∈ Σ n q such that Φx 1 + e 1 = Φx 2 + e 2 , it holds that x 1 = x 2 . Now, one can easily obtain the following equivalence between the error correctability and the error detectability. The following proposition implies that one can detect twice the number of errors that can be corrected and reconstructed.
Proposition 2. The following are equivalent: (i) the matrix Φ ∈ R np×n is (n-stacked) q-error correctable; (ii) the matrix Φ ∈ R np×n is (n-stacked) 2q-error detectable.
Assume that x, x ∈ R n and e ∈ Σ n 2q
satisfying Φx + e = Φx are given. Let e 1 and e 2 be such that e = e 1 − e 2 where e 1 , e 2 ∈ Σ n q . Thus, we have Φx + e 1 = Φx + e 2 . Since Φ ∈ R np×n is q-error correctable, it follows that x = x . (ii) ⇒ (i): Assume that x 1 , x 2 ∈ R n and e 1 , e 2 ∈ Σ n q satisfying Φx 1 +e 1 = Φx 2 +e 2 are given. Then, we have Φx 1 +e = Φx 2 where e = e 1 − e 2 ∈ Σ n 2q . Since Φ ∈ R np×n is 2q-error detectable, it follows that
Based on the notion of q-error correctability, we discuss the problem of constructing a decoder that can actually correct (nstacked) q errors and recover the original state x when v = 0 np×1 in (2) . That is, we find a map D : R np → R n such that D(ẑ) = x whereẑ = Φx + e ∈ R np and e ∈ Σ n q . This is basically achieved through 0 minimization [18, Section 3]. Here we claim that searching over a finite set is enough to solve the minimization problem.
Theorem 2. For the measurementẑ = Φx + e ∈ R np with (nstacked) q-error correctable Φ ∈ R np×n , x ∈ R n , and e ∈ Σ n q , it follows that
where
and r is any integer satisfying q ≤ r ≤ 2q.
Proof. We first show that the vector x belongs to F p,r (ẑ). Pick any subset Λ ⊂ (supp n (e)) c satisfying |Λ| = p − r.
Because Φ Λ n has full column rank by Propositions 1.
(ii) and 2, it follows that χ = (Φ Λ n ) †ẑ
Hence, x ∈ F p,r (ẑ). Now, it suffices to show that x is a minimizer of ẑ − Φχ 0 n . Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there exists x = x in F p,r (ẑ) that minimizes ẑ − Φχ 0 n , then, with e :=ẑ − Φx , we have thatẑ = Φx + e = Φx + e and e 0 n ≤ e 0 n ≤ q because e is a minimal solution. This contradicts the assumption that Φ is q-error correctable.
This theorem claims that it is enough to search over the finite set F p,r (ẑ), not the whole space R n , to solve (4) . Keeping in mind the fact that |F p,r (ẑ)| ≤ p p−r = p r , one can choose any integer r between q and 2q to minimize p r . Remark 2. The 0 minimization problem over R n is shown to be NP-hard [19] . Whereas previous research efforts have been devoted to a relaxation of the problem by imposing some additional conditions (e.g., [9] , [11] [1] , [4] , [12] , Theorem 2 is more relaxed by introducing r that can vary between q and 2q. ♦ Finally, the following lemma presents a simple criterion to verify whether a given vectorx ∈ R n coincides with the original input x.
Lemma 2. For the measurementẑ = Φx + e ∈ R np with (nstacked) q-error correctable Φ ∈ R np×n , x ∈ R n , and e ∈ Σ 
Now, bounded noise
is taken into account and a state recovery scheme estimating x is presented. More precisely, we show that any solution (χ * , ε * ) to the following relaxed 0 minimization problem yields an approximation of x asx = χ * :
where r is any integer satisfying q ≤ r ≤ 2q and
The above optimization problem is not easily implementable because the variable ε is searched over R np under constraints. Hence, we present another optimization problem, which may be considered as a relaxation of (4 ):
Whereas the problem (5) or (5 ) need not have a unique solution, the following theorem shows equivalence between (5) and (5 ), and presents an upper bound of x − x 2 for any solutionx of (5) or (5 ). 
, the following hold:
(i) two optimization problems (5) and (5 ) are equivalent (that is, a solutionx to (5) is also a solution to (5 ) and vice versa);
(
We claim thatx withê, the solution of (5), is also a solution of (5 ) and vice versa. Indeed, directly from the above definition ofê , it is obtained that
On the other hand, because ẑ
Sinceê is the minimal solution of (5), it holds that
Finally, becausex is the solution of (5 ), it follows that
Combining (6), (7), (8) , and (9) together results in
Consequently,x is a solution of (5 ) andx is a solution of (5). This concludes the claim.
(ii): Let (x,ê) be a solution (χ * , ε * ) of (5). Then, we first show that ê 0 n ≤ q. Let Λ be a subset of (supp n (e)) c satisfying |Λ| = p − q. Then, there always exists a subsetΛ ⊂ Λ such that |Λ| = p − r and max
≤ η p,q,r (Φ). Let x := (ΦΛn) †ẑΛ n , which belongs to F p,r (ẑ). Then it follows thatx = x + (ΦΛn) † vΛn because ΦΛn has full column rank, and thus (ΦΛn) † ΦΛn = I n×n . Withx at hand, let us define a noise vectorv :=ẑ Λ n − Φ Λ nx ∈ R np and an error vector e :=ẑ − Φx −v. Here, the vectorv can be decomposed as
and thus it follows that ẑ
in which, we use the fact that I np×np − ΦΛn(ΦΛn) † 2 ≤ 1 and vΛn 2 ≤ √ p − r v max . Therefore, it is clear thatx andē satisfy the constraint in (5), i.e., ẑ
. Moreover, from the construction, ē 0 n ≤ q. Finally, noting thatê is the minimal solution of (5), we have that ê 0 n ≤ ē 0 n ≤ q. Now, the solution (x,ê) of (5) yields the corresponding noise vectorv asv :=ẑ−Φx−ê, which satisfies v n i 2 ≤ v max for all i ∈ [p] by the constraint of (5). Therefore, we have two expressions for the measurementẑ = Φx+v +e = Φx+v +ê, and we are interested in the differencex :=x − x. Let e :=ê − e andṽ :=v − v. Then, ẽ 0 n ≤ 2q and ṽ
. LetΛ be any subset of (supp n (ẽ)) c such that |Λ| = p − 2q.
Then, it follows from Φx +ẽ = −ṽ that ΦΛ nx = −ṽΛ n . Since ΦΛ n has full column rank by Proposition 2.
(ii), it follows thatx = − (ΦΛ n ) †ṽΛ n . Therefore, one can compute the bound of
As in Lemma 2, a simple criterion to check whether a given vectorx ∈ R n is close to the original x with noisy measurements, is also derived in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. For the measurementẑ = Φx + e + v ∈ R np with (n-stacked) q-error correctable Φ ∈ R np×n , x ∈ R n , e ∈ Σ n q , and v ∈ R np such that v
Proof. (i): With a givenx, construct the error vectorê and the noise vectorv as follows. For 
III. CHARACTERIZATION OF REDUNDANT OBSERVABILITY
In this section, we introduce the redundant observability and relate that concept to the dynamic security index, attack detectability, and observability under sensor attacks. It will soon be revealed that an observability matrix behaves in the same way as a coding matrix as examined in the previous section, and hence its properties determine resilience of control systems under sensor attacks.
A. Redundant Observability
From a control theoretical viewpoint, the notion of redundant observability for the system (1) is defined as follows. To characterize the redundant observability in the following proposition, we first obtain the observability matrix G ∈ R np×n as follows:
is an observability matrix of the pair (A, c i ). 
B. Attack Detectability and Dynamic Security Index
Assume tentatively that there is no control input, disturbance, nor noise in the system (1) so that we can focus on the attack signal only. Then, the output measurements for a finite time period are collected and the stacked output sequence is computed as
. . .
Noting that the situation is exactly the same as the noiseless case in Section II-A and a [0:n−1] is (n-stacked) q-sparse by Assumption 2, we can introduce the notion of q-attack detectability of the system (1) as follows.
Definition 4.
The pair (A, C) or the dynamical system (1) without disturbances/noises is said to be q-attack detectable if, for all x(0), x (0) ∈ R n and a
Furthermore, a direct comparison between Definitions 1 and 4 simply leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 4. The following are equivalent: (i) the pair (A, C) is q-attack detectable; (ii) the matrix G is (n-stacked) q-error detectable.
As a tool for the vulnerability analysis of a system, the security index quantifies fundamental limitations on the attack detectability. That is, the dynamic security index of the system (1), α d (A, C) , is defined by the minimum number of sensor attacks for adversaries to remain undetectable and is computed by examining the system's strong observability in [8] as
It is shown in the following proposition that the dynamic security index can also be characterized by the error detectability of the observability matrix G through its cospark.
Proof. When Av = λv, one can trivially check that
Gx 0 n = min
Gx 0 n because G ∈ R np×n is a real matrix, it suffices to show that
Gx 0 n . Now, we claim that there exists v * ∈ V(A) such that
Gx 0 n .
Let us denote the optimal value of the problem (13) by
By the equivalence between Proposition 1.(ii) and (iii) with the observability matrix G, there exists an index set Λ ⊂ [p] satisfying |Λ| = p − α * such that the observability matrix G π Λ n does not have full column rank but the observability matrix G π (Λ∪{i}) n has full column rank for every i ∈ Λ c . That is, the pair (A, C π Λ ) is not observable but the pair (A, C π Λ∪{i} ) is observable for every i ∈ Λ c . Applying the Popov-BelevitchHautus (PBH) observability test, we conclude that there exist λ * ∈ C and v * ∈ V(A) such that
and c i v
The claim easily follows by verifying that Gv * 0 n = α * .
C. Observability under Sparse Sensor Attacks
In this section, the notion of observability under q-sparse sensor attacks is introduced and an equivalent condition is directly derived from the definition, as follows. pair (A, C) or the dynamical system (1) without disturbances/noises is said to be observable under qsparse sensor attacks if the initial state x(0) can be determined from the outputȳ over a finite number of sampling steps with any sensor attack a satisfying Assumption 2.
Proposition 6. The following are equivalent: (i) the pair (A, C) is observable under q-sparse sensor attacks; (ii) the matrix G is (n-stacked) q-error correctable.
Proof. Note that the output sequenceȳ [0:n−1] is given bȳ
by Assumption 2, the result directly follows from Definition 2 which says that G is (n-stacked) q-error correctable if and only if x(0) can be reconstructed from the output measurements
IV. DESIGN OF ATTACK-RESILIENT ESTIMATOR
An attack-resilient state estimator E, which combines the partial observers O i and the decoder D, is designed in this section. First, the partial observers O i are designed by applying the Kalman observability decomposition to each sensor output. Second, the previously developed error correction technique tailored into this specific problem constitutes the decoder D and it recovers the original state variable x.
A. Design of Partial Observers
With only one measurementȳ i (k) of the plant (1), a singleoutput system is obtained as follows:
The observability matrix G i of (14) is used to divide the n-dimensional state space into two subspaces. To derive a transformation matrix, first, let ν i be the observability index of (A, c i ), i.e., ν i := rank(G i ). Then the set of the first ν i rows of G i is linearly independent. The null space of G i , N (G i ), which is A-invariant, is the unobservable subspace. Furthermore, the quotient space R n /N (G i ) is sometimes called, with abuse of terminology, the observable subspace. The matrices Z i ∈ R n×ν i and W i ∈ R n×(n−ν i ) are selected such that their columns are orthonormal bases of N (G i ) ⊥ (= R(G i )) and N (G i ), respectively. Finally, by the Kalman observability decomposition, the state x is decomposed into the observable sub-state z i ∈ R ν i and the unobservable sub-state w i ∈ R n−ν i with a similarity transformation
Since it follows that Z i AW i = O ν i ×(n−ν i ) and c i W i = 0 1×(n−ν i ) from the construction of Z i and W i , the change of variable (15) leads the original single-output system (14) to the decomposed form of
By dropping the unobservable sub-state w i from (16), the observable quotient sub-system of (16) is obtained as
where S i := Z i AZ i , t i := c i Z i , and the pair (S i , t i ) is observable. Then, the partial observer O i is designed by a Luenberger observer for (17) given in the following form:
where the injection gain L i is chosen so that
is Schur stable. The dynamics of state estimation errorz i := z i − z i is governed by
whose solution becomes
Here, the attack-induced estimation error vector e i (k) may have arbitrary values. For all k ≥ 0 and i ∈ [p], there exist µ F ≥ 1 and 0 < β < 1 such that
Then, one can easily show that
verges to w max .
B. Design of the Decoder
The decoder collects all the dataẑ i from the partial observers O i and formulates the problem in the form of (2) . To this end, (15), is used. Appending n − ν i zero row vectors, 0 1×n , to each Z i and stacking them all, we have in Section II. Now, (21) with (19) is written in a compact form asẑ
. It is supposed that additional zero elements are also appended to v i (k) and e i (k) as in (22).
Since (23) exactly matches with (2), one can directly apply the error correction technique developed in Section II into (23). Theorems 3 and 4 are mainly employed so as to recover x(k). Before applying them, one should check that three conditions on those theorems are satisfied for the given system (1): boundedness of v(k), q-sparsity of e(k), and q-error correctability of Φ. The first two conditions are easily satisfied by Assumptions 1 and 2. That is, the noise vector v i (k) is bounded by v max (k) for all i ∈ [p] by (20) , which is induced from Assumption 1. Since the error vector e i (k) depends only on the attack element a i (j) for 0 ≤ j ≤ k − 1 and a(j) is q-sparse according to Assumption 2, the vector e(k) is (n-stacked) q-sparse. An additional assumption should be declared for the last condition, the q-error correctability of Φ, to be fulfilled. Assumption 3. The pair (A, C) is 2q-redundant observable. ♦ Under Assumption 3, Propositions 2 and 3 ensure the qerror correctability of G where G is given in (10) . Thus, Φ is also q-error correctable because R(
by the construction of Φ and its elements Z i . Therefore, all three conditions on Theorems 3 and 4 hold. The decoder's configuration is sketched in Fig. 2 and its operation is described in Algorithm 1. During the operation of the decoder, the monitoring scheme that the selector S and the switch s perform is running on the basis of Theorem 4, whereas the calculator C and the minimizer M have their roots in Theorems 1 and 3, respectively. Note thatx of each selector S i in Fig. 2 representsx at the stage of monitoring (line 3 of Algorithm 1) andx during the updating step (line 10 of Algorithm 1). If f ≤ q, the successful state estimation is ensured by Theorem 4.(i). More specifically, we have x − x 2 ≤ κ c p,q,r (Φ)v max . In this case, the index set Λ can be supposed to be attack-free, and hence the calculator C can recover the original state x approximately byx = (Φ Λ n ) †ẑ Λ n , which is attributed to Theorem 1. On the other hand, if f > q, the state estimatex is not close enough to the original state x Algorithm 1 Operation of the decoder
if f ≤ q then
5:
Switch s selects the line from C 6:
Calculator C setsx =x 7:
Switch s selects the line from M
9:
Minimizer M solves (5 ) and producesx =x opt 10:
end if 12: end while by Theorem 4.(ii). Hence, the algorithm goes to the minimizer step (i.e., the switch s chooses the side of the minimizer M) to figure out new healthy sensors and the state estimatesx byx opt . Furthermore, Theorem 3 guarantees that x − x 2 ≤ κ c p,q,r (Φ)v max . These results are summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, the estimator E equipped with the observers O i given by (18) and the decoder D employing Algorithm 1, guarantees that
where lim k→∞ v max (k) = w max .
Remark 3. For the resilient state estimation, most of the computational burden originates from the process of solving the optimization problem. The proposed decoder reduces the computational effort by combining the attack detection mechanism with the optimization process. Algorithm 1 only requires the minimization problem to be solved for a very short time interval when the attacker first attempts to inject false data so that the decoder has f > q at that instant. On the other hand, the estimator works as if there is no attack and computes only one simple pseudoinverse of a matrix during normal operation when f ≤ q is guaranteed. ♦ Remark 4. Other observer-based resilient state estimators such as those in [4] and [14] , consist of all possible combinations of estimator candidates. Thus, they need to run p q estimators so that the required memory size is n p q . On the other hand, the total memory size of all partial observers in the proposed estimator, p i=1 ν i , is not greater than np because the size of each partial observer O i is ν i ≤ n for all i ∈ [p]. ♦
V. SIMULATION RESULTS: THREE INERTIA SYSTEM
To verify the effectiveness of the proposed scheme, simulations with a three inertia system are conducted in this section. The configuration of the three inertia system is described in 
with the matrices In addition, the plant is corrupted by the uniformly bounded process disturbance d and measurement noise n with d max = n max = 0.001. To conduct a discrete-time simulation, the zero-order hold equivalent model of (24) is considered, that is, the matrices of the discrete-time system (1) are given by A := e AcTs , B :=
Ts 0 e Acτ dτ B c , and C := C c where T s := 1 ms denotes the sampling time. Note that the pair (A, C) is 2-redundant observable, which implies that one can correct the 1-sparse attack signal and its dynamic security index becomes 3. The control objective is to make the output θ 3 follow the step reference θ 3,ref .
To this end, an observer-based feedback integral control scheme is adopted, as illustrated in [20, Section 6.7] and also in Fig. 3(b) . First, as if the state x is available. Then, instead of using the conventional Luenberger observer, the proposed estimator E provides the estimatex of x. The injection gains L i of the partial observer (18) in E are chosen arbitrarily such that F i = S i − L i t i is Schur stable. Attack signals are illustrated in Fig. 4(a) , which describes that adversaries launch a measurement data injection attack at t = 2 s so that the first sensor is compromised. Figures 4(b) and 4(c) show state trajectories θ 1 (t),θ 2 (t), and their estimates. It demonstrates the attackresilient property of our estimation algorithm. Finally, Fig. 4(d) shows the reference tracking performance of the proposed control scheme.
VI. CONCLUSION
An LTI system is said to be 2q-redundant observable if it is observable even after eliminating any 2q measurements. Relationships between the redundant observability and the security problems on cyber-physical systems under sensor attacks have been examined. To summarize, 2q-redundant observability implies that the numbers of detectable and correctable sensor attacks are 2q and q, respectively. In addition, the dynamic security index, the minimum number of attacks to remain undetectable, is 2q + 1.
Assuming that the measurement data injection attack is qsparse and the disturbances/noises are bounded, an attackresilient and robust state estimation scheme has been proposed under 2q-redundant observability. The proposed estimator consists of a bank of partial observers operating based on the Kalman observability decomposition and a decoder exploiting error correction techniques. In terms of time complexity, the decoder reduces the required computational effort by reducing the search space to a finite set and by combining a detection algorithm with the optimization process. On the other hand, in terms of space complexity, the required memory is linear with the number of sensors by means of the decomposition used for constructing a bank of partial observers.
